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美智庫:中巴同盟的局限

Abstract: After the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan in May 2011, Pakistani politicalleaders played up their country’s relations with China,touting Beijing as an alternative partner to Washington. But China’s concerns over Pakistan’sfuture stability will likely limit the extent to which it will help Pakistan out ofits economic difficulties. While Chinahas an interest in maintaining strong security ties with Pakistan, the economic relationship is not veryextensive and the notion that Chinese ties could serve as a replacement for U.S. ties isfar-fetched. Instead of wringing hands over Chinese influence on Pakistan, the U.S.should seek cooperation from Beijing inencouraging a more stable and prosperous Pakistan—which will benefit allparties involved.
摘要:2011年5月美國襲擊了奧薩馬·本拉登在巴基斯坦的藏身之處后,巴基斯坦的領導人開始鼓吹他們與中國的關系,大有用北京取代華盛頓之勢。不過中國為巴基斯坦未來的穩定感到擔憂,這可能會影響到北京幫助巴基斯坦走出經濟窘境的力度。中國熱衷于與巴基斯坦保持緊密的防衛關系,兩者之間的經濟聯系則不溫不火,而用中國來取代美國的作用也只是一廂情愿罷了。美國應該在支持一個更加穩定和繁榮的巴基斯坦方面尋求與北京的合作,而不是排擠中國在巴基斯坦的影響——這對各方都有裨益。

In the wake of the U.S. raid on Osama binLaden’s compound last May and deteriorating relations between Islamabad andWashington, Pakistani leaders have sought to play up their country’s relationswith China, touting Beijing as an alternative partner to Washington. However, China’s concerns about the future stability anddevelopment of Pakistan willlimit the extent to which Chinawill bail Pakistan out ofits current economic difficulties, and the degree to which China will seek to drive a wedge between Islamabad and Washington.
去年5月美國襲擊了本拉登的藏身之地,伊斯蘭堡和華盛頓關系惡化,緊接著巴基斯坦領導人熱捧巴中關系,鼓吹華盛頓可以被北京取而代之。然而中國對巴基斯坦未來的穩定和發展的擔憂,不僅會影響到中國幫助巴基斯坦走出目前的經濟窘境的力度,也會對中國尋求破壞伊斯蘭堡和華盛頓之間的關系造成影響。

Chinese security interests in Pakistan are driven primarily by China’s desire to contain India. Beijinghas built up Pakistan’sconventional military as well as nuclear and missile capabilities over theyears to help keep India offbalance and focused on threats emanating from Pakistan. China’s concrete economic and politicalinterests in Pakistanitself are not that extensive. China’seconomic commitment to Pakistan,for instance, is not especially impressive in size and has shown clear limits. China has shown little interest in propping up Pakistan’seconomy and has not provided substantial economic aid, even during times ofneed.
中國在巴基斯坦的安全利益主要是因為中國渴望牽制印度。近些年來,北京通過增強巴基斯坦的常規軍事以及核、導彈的能力來保持對印度的壓制,使其把精力集中在應對來自巴基斯坦的威脅。中國在巴基斯坦實際的經濟和政治利益則要寡淡的多。比如中國對巴基斯坦經濟許諾的規模并不那么令人印象深刻,這個局限已經是老生常談了。中國在支持巴基斯坦經濟方面興趣索然,即便是在最需要的時刻也沒有提供實質性的經濟援助。

In the past, U.S.officials have worried that pushing Pakistantoo hard to crack down on terrorists could drive Islamabadmore firmly into Beijing’sembrace. But China’s lukewarm response to Pakistan’s recent overturesdemonstrates that there are limits to what Islamabad can expect from its“all-weather friend”—a term often used by Pakistani officials when referring toChina. While China has aninterest in maintaining strong security ties with Pakistan,the notion that Chinese ties could serve as a replacement for U.S. ties hasbeen overstated by Pakistani officials. The U.S. has provided considerablyhigher amounts of economic and military aid to Pakistan over the past decadeand also serves as a link to the rest of the Western nations, which otherwisewould likely be inclined to sanction Pakistan for its nuclear and terrorismactivities.
過去,美國政府擔心在鎮壓恐怖分子方面對巴基斯坦的打壓太甚可能會使伊斯蘭堡堅定地倒向北京的懷抱。但是中國對巴基斯坦最近的提議反應冷談,這表明了巴基斯坦期望從中國這個官方提及時言必稱‘全天候的朋友’身上得到的也是有限制的。中國熱衷于與巴基斯坦保持緊密的防衛關系,兩者之間的經濟聯系則不溫不火,而用中國來取代美國的作用也只是一廂情愿罷了。在過去的幾十年中,美國已經向巴基斯坦提供了相當多的經濟和軍事援助,同時充當著連接其他西方國家的紐帶,否則它們會因為巴基斯坦的核武器與恐怖主義活動而加以制裁。

U.S. policymakers must recognize these limits to the benefits that Pakistan will receive from China. Chinais increasingly concerned about Islamist extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, and there may be room for Washington to seek Beijing’scooperation in encouraging a more stable and prosperous Pakistan. The U.S. should make clear to China that adopting a more holistic approach toterrorism issues in Pakistanwould help mitigate threats to both Washingtonand Beijing, since Islamabad’s support for some terrorist groupsstrengthens the ideological base, logistical capabilities, and financialsupport for all Islamist terrorist groups.
美國的決策者必須意識到巴基斯坦從中國獲得的利益是有限制的。中國日益擔心巴基斯坦境內的伊斯蘭極端主義和恐怖主義,這使得華盛頓有余地在支持一個更加穩定和繁榮的巴基斯坦方面尋求與北京的合作。美國應該明確地告訴中國,在巴基斯坦的恐怖主義問題上采取通盤考量有助于緩解華盛頓和北京(面臨)的威脅,因為伊斯蘭堡支持的一些恐怖組織為所有伊斯蘭恐怖組織加強了意識形態基礎、后勤能力以及財政支持。

Long-Standing Security Ties
由來已久的防衛關系


Pakistan and Chinahave long-standing strategic ties, dating back five decades. China maintains a robust defense relationshipwith Pakistan and views astrong partnership with Pakistanas a useful way to contain Indian power in the region and divert Indianmilitary force and strategic attention away from China. The China–Pakistanpartnership serves both Chinese and Pakistani interests by presenting India with apotential two-front theater in the event of war with either country. Chineseofficials also view a certain degree of India–Pakistan tension as advancingtheir own strategic interests, as such friction bogs Indiadown in South Asia and interferes with New Delhi’sability to assert its global ambitions and compete with China at theinternational level.
巴基斯坦和中國的戰略伙伴關系可以追溯到50年前。中國同巴基斯坦保持著密切的防御聯系,并認為與巴基斯坦良好的合作關系可以在這一地區有效地牽制印度,把印度的軍事力量和戰略注意力從中國身上移開。中巴的伙伴關系是雙方利益均沾,無論印度和其中哪個國家開戰,都將面臨腹背受敵的威脅。中國政府同時認為印巴之間某種程度的緊張關系增強了他們自身的戰略利益,除此之外,印度在南亞泥潭中遇到的阻力,以及新德里堅持其全球野心和在國際層面上同中國競爭受到的干擾也隨之增加。

China is Pakistan’slargest defense supplier. The Chinese JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft iscurrently under serial production at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, and aninitial batch of 250 to 300 planes is scheduled. Chinaalso plans to provide Pakistanwith J-10 medium-role combat aircraft, with an initial delivery of 30 to 35planes.[1] Other recent sales of conventional weapons include F-22P frigateswith helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, T-85 tanks, F-7 aircraft, small arms, andammunition. China alsohelped Pakistanbuild its Heavy Mechanical Complex, Aeronautical Complex, and several defenseproduction units. While the U.S.has sanctioned Pakistan inthe past—in 1965 and again in 1990—Chinahas consistently supported Pakistan’smilitary modernization.
中國是巴基斯坦最大的軍火供應商。中國的梟龍戰機在巴基斯坦航空綜合中心開始量產,預計首批生產250到300架飛機。同時中國計劃向巴基斯坦提供殲10戰斗機,首批交付30到35架。最近銷售的常規武器還包括攜帶直升機的F22P導彈護衛艦,K8噴氣式教練機,T85坦克,殲7戰斗機,輕武器和彈藥。中國還幫巴基斯坦建立了重型機械廠、航空綜合中心以及一些國防生產單位。美國在1965年和1990年兩次對巴基斯坦進行制裁的時候,中國始終堅定地支持巴基斯坦的軍事現代化。

There are signs that Pakistan–China defensecooperation received a boost following the United States’ May 2 raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan.Two weeks after the raid, Pakistan’sprime minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, traveled to Beijingin an attempt to showcase the China–Pakistan relationship as the pillar of Pakistan’sforeign policy. The U.S.decision to pursue the bin Laden raid unilaterally without prior notificationof Pakistani officials incensed the Pakistani military leadership.
種種跡象表明,5月2日美國對本拉登在巴境內阿伯塔巴德的藏匿處發動的襲擊進一步推動了巴中的防御合作。在襲擊的兩個星期之后,巴總理優素福·拉扎·吉拉尼出訪北京,著力把中巴關系作為巴基斯坦外交政策的定海神針展示給外界。美國在沒有事先通知巴基斯坦官方的情況下繼續追捕本拉登的行為激怒了巴基斯坦的軍方領導人。

To demonstrate its displeasure over theoperation, Pakistan kickedout 90 U.S.military trainers from the country and turned its attention to its“all-weather” friend. In response to Pakistan’s overtures, China called on theU.S. to respect the “independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity” ofPakistan and announced it would expedite the delivery of 50 JF-17 aircraftequipped with upgraded avionics to Pakistan.[2] However, when Pakistan’sdefense minister claimed that Pakistan had invited China to start building anaval base at Gwadar Port, Chinese officials publicly dismissed the notion.Despite Pakistani assurances that they did not provide Chinese officials withaccess to wreckage from the stealth helicopter used by U.S. Special Forces inthe bin Laden raid, U.S.intelligence officials reportedly believe the Pakistanis did allow Chineseengineers to inspect the helicopter parts before they were returned to the U.S.[3]
為了表達對此次行為的不滿,巴基斯坦把90美軍教官遣散回國,轉而把注意力放到了那個‘全天候’的朋友身上。作為對巴方提議的回應,中國要求美國尊重巴基斯坦的‘獨立、主權和領土完整’,并宣布將加快把50架升級過航電設備的梟龍戰機交付給巴方。然而當巴國防部長宣布巴基斯坦將邀請中國在瓜達爾港建立海軍基地的時候,中國官方公開否認了這一設想。盡管巴基斯坦保證他們沒有授權讓中國政府接近美國在襲擊本拉登時所使用的隱形直升機的殘骸,據傳美國的情報人員相信巴基斯坦在把飛機歸還美方之前的確讓中國專家勘驗了飛機殘骸。

Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Cooperation.It is widely acknowledged that Chinatransferred equipment and technology and provided scientific expertise to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missileprograms throughout the 1980s and 1990s, enhancing Pakistan’s strength in the SouthAsian strategic balance. The most significant development in Chinese–Pakistanimilitary cooperation occurred in 1992, when Chinasupplied Pakistanwith 34 short-range ballistic M-11 missiles. Beijingalso built a turn-key ballistic missile manufacturing facility near Rawalpindi, and helped Pakistan develop the 750-km-rangesolid-fueled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile.
核武器和彈道導彈的合作。眾所周知,上世紀80到90年代,中國向巴基斯坦的核武器和彈道導彈項目轉移了設備和技術并提供技術人員,增強了巴基斯坦在南亞的戰略平衡。1992年是中巴軍事合作的里程碑,中國向巴基斯坦提供了34枚東風-11短程彈道導彈。北京還在拉瓦爾品第(巴基斯坦東北部)附近建立了成套的彈道導彈生產基地,幫助巴基斯坦研發了射程為750公里的固體燃料推進的沙欣1號彈道導彈。

In a recently released letter from 2003,Abdul Qadeer (A. Q.) Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who was instrumentalin developing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and who confessed in 2004 torunning a nuclear black market from Pakistan, suggests that China had suppliedPakistan with significant quantities of low-enriched uranium, allowing Pakistanto accelerate the production of weapons-grade uranium in the early 1980s.[4]There are also indications that China provided Pakistan with nuclear warheaddesigns from China’s 1966 nuclear test.[5] In 1994, information surfaced thatChina’s Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation had transferred 5,000 ring magnetsto a Pakistani nuclear weapons lab for use in gas centrifuges to enrichuranium.[6] The harsh international reaction to the transfer prompted China topledge in 1996 that it would not allow any further cooperation withunsafeguarded nuclear facilities.[7]
據最近公開的一份2003年的文件稱,2004年,主持研發了巴基斯坦核武器項目的巴核科學家阿卜杜勒·卡迪爾·汗坦承自己在巴基斯坦運作著一個地下核市場,并暗示中國在上世紀80年代早期向巴基斯坦提供了低濃縮鈾的關鍵技術,允許巴基斯坦加速生產出武器級濃縮鈾。有證據表明中國向巴基斯坦提供了1966年中國核試驗的核彈頭設計圖。資料顯示,1994年中國的核工業集團向巴基斯坦核武器實驗室移交了5000個環形磁鐵用于制造能夠提高鈾濃度的氣體離心機。面對國際社會的強烈反響,中國于1996年承諾不會同沒有安全保障的核設施進行進一步的合作。

China helped Pakistan buildtwo civilian nuclear reactors at the Chasma site in the Punjabprovince under agreements made before it joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) in 2004. More recently, Chinahas been planning to build two additional new nuclear reactors for Pakistan (Chasma III and Chasma IV), but the U.S. has indicated that Beijing must first seek an exemption from theNSG for any future nuclear technology transfers. When China joinedthe NSG, it subjected itself to rules that forbid the sale and export ofnuclear technology to countries that have not signed the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Beijing hasargued that the new proposed sale should be viewed as part of the earlieragreement struck with Pakistanbefore Beijingjoined the NSG and thus be “grandfathered” into international acceptance.
2004年,中國在加入核供應集團(NSG)之前根據協議幫助巴基斯坦在旁遮普省建立了兩座民用核反應堆。最近,中國計劃為巴基斯坦修建另外兩座核反應堆,美國提醒中國為了將來的核技術轉移務必要從核供應集團取得豁免權。中國在加入核供應集團之時,就接受了禁止把核技術銷售或出口到沒有簽署《核不擴散條約》國家的協議。北京則認為新的銷售提議應該被看作是早前與巴基斯坦簽署的協議,這是在北京加入核供應集團以及被國際社會所認可之前的事情。

An Obama Administration decision to allowthe China–Pakistan nuclear deal to advance unhindered would contradict earlierstatements by U.S. officialsthat the construction of the two new nuclear plants would be inconsistent with China’s NSGcommitments. It could also jeopardize nuclear safety and security on thesubcontinent, given that Pakistan’sincreased access to civilian nuclear technology poses a potential proliferationthreat.
奧巴馬政府沒有對中巴的核交易施加阻力,這與之前美國官方的聲明相左,聲明稱中國新建的兩座核電站違背了其在核供應集團上的承諾。同時,巴基斯坦對民用核技術進一步應用造成了潛在的擴散之虞,危及核平衡以及南亞次大陸的安全。

Though Pakistanconsiders China a morereliable defense partner than the U.S.,Islamabad should also recognize that China’s support has its limits, especiallyduring times of conflict and tension between New Delhiand Islamabad.When Pakistan sought Chinese assistance during its 1965 war with India, Beijingencouraged Islamabad to withdraw its forces from Indian territory.[8] Duringthe 1999 Indo–Pakistani border war in Kargil, Beijing privately supported U.S.calls for Pakistan to withdraw its forces from the heights of Kargil on theIndian side of the Line of Control to defuse the crisis, and apparentlycommunicated this stance to Pakistani leaders. The Chinese position during theKargil episode helped spur a thaw in Indian–Chinese relations. During the2001–2002 Indo–Pakistani military crisis, Chinastayed neutral and counseled restraint on both sides, declaring that China was a“neighbor and friend of both countries.”[9]
盡管巴基斯坦認為中國是一個比美國更加靠得住的盟友,伊斯蘭堡也應該認識到中國的支持是有限的,特別是在新德里與伊斯蘭堡劍拔弩張和沖突的時候。巴基斯坦曾在1965年與印度的戰爭中尋求中國的幫助,北京慫恿伊斯蘭堡從印度境內撤軍。1990年印巴邊境卡爾吉爾戰爭期間,美國要求巴基斯坦把軍隊從卡爾吉爾印度控制區的制高點上撤軍來緩解危機,北京表面上與巴基斯坦領導人相互通氣,暗地里卻支持美國的做法。中國在卡爾吉爾問題上的立場使得印巴關系得以緩和。在2001至2002年印巴軍事危機中,中國嚴守中立并呼吁雙方保持克制,聲稱中國是兩個國家的鄰居和朋友。

Rising Concerns about Terrorism
對恐怖主義越來越深的憂慮


One source of tension between Beijing and Islamabadthat has surfaced over the last few years is Chinese concern over some ChineseUighur separatists receiving sanctuary and terrorist training on Pakistaniterritory. The Chinese province of Xinjiang is home toeight million Muslim Uighurs, many of whom resent the growing presence andeconomic grip of the Han Chinese on the region. Some Uighurs have agitated foran independent “East Turkestan.” To mollifyChina’s concerns, Pakistan has begun to clamp down on Uighur settlements and onreligious schools purportedly used as training grounds for militants.[10] Mediareports indicate that Pakistan may have extradited as many as nine Uighurs toChina in April 2009 after accusing them of involvement in terroristactivities.[11] While it is unclear which percentage of Uighur separatists areaffiliated with al-Qaeda, terrorism expert Walid Phares testified before theU.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission in 2009 that jihadists makeup about 5 percent to 10 percent of the Uighur movement.[12] He has also notedthe presence of a “jihadi web” in Pakistan that includes Uighur extremists.[13]
近些年來,北京和伊斯蘭堡關系緊張的其中一個原因是中國擔心某些維吾爾分離勢力在巴基斯坦境內避難并進行恐怖主義訓練。中國的新疆省是八百萬穆斯林維吾爾人的家鄉,他們當中的很多人對漢族人在這一地區的存在以及對維吾爾人經濟上的攝奪感到憤恨,從而謀求‘東突厥斯坦’的獨立。為了緩解中國的疑慮,巴基斯坦開始對維吾爾人的定居點以及據稱被當做激進分子訓練場地的宗教學校進行彈壓。據媒體報道,2009年巴基斯坦曾向中國引渡了9名維族人,他們被控參與恐怖主義活動。隸屬于基地組織的維吾爾分離勢力的百分比尚不清楚,恐怖主義專家瓦利德·法勒斯在2009年美中經濟安全審查委員會召開之前證實,圣戰分子由5%到10%的維吾爾人所組成。同時他還提到了存在于巴基斯坦境內的‘圣戰網絡’活躍著維吾爾極端分子。

In July 2009, ethnic violence broke out in Urumqi, the capital ofXinjiang province, in which at least 197 people were killed and 1,700injured—mostly Han Chinese. The rioting began when roughly 1,000 Uighurprotesters were confronted by riot police. The Chinese government blamed theviolence primarily on Uighur exiles, but Pakistani radical influence was alsocited as contributing to the violence.[14]
2009年7月,新疆首府烏魯木齊發生了恐怖主義襲擊,造成至少197人死亡1700多人受傷,絕大部分是漢族人。1000多名維吾爾抗議者和防暴警察的對峙成為了此次騷亂的導火索。中國政府就此次暴亂只譴責了維吾爾分裂勢力,但(實際上)巴基斯坦激進組織的勢力也參與其中。

More recent attacks in Xinjiang in lateJuly 2011 that killed 20 people prompted Chinese criticisms of Pakistan for failing to crack down on the trainingof Uighur separatists in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.[15] TheChinese rebuke mirrored U.S.calls for the Pakistani government to do more to rein in Afghan insurgents whoalso find sanctuary in Pakistan.Local Chinese authorities in Xinjiang charged that the person who conducted theJuly attacks in Kashgar had received training in Pakistan. The accusations wererepeated in the China Daily newspaper. Pakistani political leader MushahidHussain acknowledged in an op-ed that another attack similar to the one inKashgar over the summer would have serious implications for China–Pakistanties.[16]
最近一次對新疆的襲擊發生在2011年7月,造成20人死亡,中國嚴厲批評巴基斯坦未能鎮壓阿富汗邊境部落接受訓練的維吾爾分離勢力。起初是美國要求巴基斯坦對在其境內容身的阿富汗叛亂分子采取更加嚴格的限制,現在輪到中國譴責了。中國的新疆當局指責參與了7月襲擊喀什的人員曾在巴基斯坦接受訓練。《中國日報》英文版也進行了譴責。巴基斯坦政治領導人穆沙希德·侯賽因公開承認今年夏天另一場針對喀什的類似襲擊可能會對中巴關系產生重大影響。

Chinese officials are increasinglyconnecting the level of terrorist activity in Pakistanto instability in western China.One Chinese academic has noted in his writings that China has developed a moreneutral position on the Indo–Pakistani dispute over Kashmir over the pastdecade in part because China believes that the dispute could have implicationsfor ethnic-religious unrest in China, especially in Tibet or Xinjiang.[17] Inthis context, the ascendance of Taliban forces in either Pakistan orAfghanistan is clearly not in China’s interest. But rather than encouraging Islamabad to adopt acomprehensive approach toward countering terrorism, Chinese leaders have usedtheir relationships with Pakistani military officials, and with the Islamistpolitical parties, to persuade them to discourage attacks on Chinese interests.Before 9/11, for example, the Chinese reached agreements with the Taliban toprevent Uighur separatists from using Afghanistan as a training groundfor militant activities.[18]
巴基斯坦境內的恐怖主義活動使中國對其西部的穩定感到憂心忡忡。一位中國學者在他的著作里提到,過去十年間,中國就克什米爾問題在印巴之間采取了更加中立的態度,這是因為中國認為印巴之爭可能會殃及池魚,把中國卷入民族和宗教的動蕩之中,尤其是在西藏或者新疆。就這一點而言,不管是阿富汗還是巴基斯坦境內的塔利班武裝都無關中國的利益。中國領導人與其催促伊斯蘭堡采取綜合方案來反恐,還不如動用他們與巴基斯坦軍方以及伊斯蘭政治領導人的關系。比如在911之前,中國就阻止阿富汗成為維吾爾分離勢力軍事行動的訓練場地問題同塔利班達成一致。

Chinese vice premier in charge of publicsecurity, Meng Jianchu, visited Pakistan in late September 2011, in whatoutside observers described as a mission aimed at strengthening cooperationwith Islamabad in dealing with the challenge of militancy in Xinjiang.[19] But,according to American China expert Michael Swaine, Beijing is balancing itsinterest in suppressing the Uighur threat with the possibility that suchsuppression might further fuel Uighur separatism and provoke further attacksagainst Chinese interests.[20] One of the main reasons that China has refrainedfrom providing material support to the NATO mission in Afghanistan is to avoidbeing portrayed as part of an alliance against Islam.[21] The Chinese believethat the United States’ low favorability ratings in Muslim countries is proofthat U.S. interference in the internal affairs of these countries comes withserious blowback.[22]
2011年9月,中國主管公共安全的副總理孟建柱訪問巴基斯坦,外界觀察員認為此次出訪旨在就新疆動亂問題加強與伊斯蘭堡的合作。不過按照美籍華人專家邁克爾·斯韋因的觀點,北京對維吾爾人的鎮壓可能會使維吾爾分離主義愈演愈烈并進一步損害中國的利益,所以北京正在謀求利益平衡。另一個重要原因就是中國拒絕對在阿富汗搞事的北約提供實質的支持,使中國沒有成為反伊斯蘭聯盟的成員。中國認為美國在穆斯林國家難孚眾望證明了美國干涉這些國家的國際事務帶來了難以消弭的后遺癥。

Tension has also surfaced between Islamabad and Beijing inrecent years over attacks by Islamist extremists on Chinese workers, whichnumber about 10,000 in Pakistan.This tension came to a head in summer 2007 when Islamist militants kidnappedseveral Chinese citizens whom they accused of running a brothel in Islamabad. China wasincensed by this incident, and its complaints to Pakistani authorities likelycontributed to Pakistan’s decision to finally launch a military operation atthe Red Mosque in Islamabad, where the militants had holed up for seven months.Around the same time, three Chinese officials were killed in Peshawar. Several days later, a suicidebomber attacked a group of Chinese engineers in Baluchistan.Senior Chinese leaders, such as President Hu Jintao, have called on Pakistanileaders to increase protection of Chinese workers in the country and threatenedto pull funding from projects where Chinese workers have come under threat.[23]
近年來伊斯蘭堡和北京的緊張也表現在伊斯蘭極端分子對中國工人的襲擊,巴基斯坦有1萬名中國工人。2007年,兩國關系達到了白熱化。伊斯蘭激進分子綁架了數名中國公民,他們被指控在伊斯蘭堡開設妓院。中國對這次事件感到憤怒,巴基斯坦當局迫于壓力,對伊斯蘭堡市內的紅色清真寺發動了軍事行動,激進分子在此藏匿了七個月之久。與此同時,三名中國官員在白沙瓦遇害。幾天之后,一名自殺式人彈在俾路支省襲擊了一群中國工程師。中國的高級領導人,比如胡總主席在訪問巴基斯坦時要求增加對中國工人的保護,并威脅將暫停受害的中國工人所在地項目所需的資金。

Another sign that China was feelingincreasingly compelled to pressure Pakistan to adopt stricter counterterrorismpolicies was when, in December 2008, Beijing dropped its resistance to banningthe Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD—a front organization for the Pakistan-basedLashkar-e-Tayyiba, responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks) inthe United Nations Security Council. Before then, China had vetoed Security Councilresolutions seeking to ban the JuD.
中國強迫巴基斯坦采取更加嚴厲的反恐政策也是迫不得已的,2008年11月,中國不再反對聯合國安理會制裁達瓦慈善會(巴基斯坦虔誠軍的前身,2008年11月發動了對孟買的恐怖襲擊)。在此之前,中國否決了聯合國安理會對達瓦慈善會的制裁。

The Economic Relationship: SurprisinglyLimited
經濟關系:限制重重


Pakistan’s portrayal of its relationship with China features exaggeration of theeconomic dimension of the relationship. Pakistani media routinely report hugenumbers for investment and financing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC),numbers that cannot be verified by any independent source, including by theChinese government or the Chinese companies supposedly involved. WhilePakistani officials talk of a total of $25 billion in Chinese investment in Pakistanso far, the PRC’s official figure of direct investment through 2010 is $1.83billion.[24]
巴基斯坦在描述與中國的關系時夸大了經濟層面上的聯系。巴基斯坦媒體數十年如一日地報道著來自中國政府或企業的巨額投資和融資,這些賬目沒有獨立的來源可供查實。巴基斯坦官員稱迄今為止中國在巴基斯坦累計投資了250億美元,而中國官方統計2011年的直接投資是18.3億美元。

The Heritage Foundation’s China GlobalTracker documents investments as well as engineering and construction contractsof $100 million or more since the beginning of 2005, as reported by thecompanies. The China Tracker shows only $1.2 billion in such investment andcontracts combined through 2010.[25] These are dominated by telecommunications,with China Mobile acquiring Paktel and investing in improvements in Pakistan’stelecommunications system, such as paying the Chinese engineering company GreatWall to launch a satellite.
美國傳統基金會(本文的研究機構)的《中國全球追蹤》也證實了自2005年以來,中國在巴基斯坦的投資以及工程建筑合同達到了1億美元或者更多。據《中國追蹤》的記載,2010年的投資和合同加起來只有12億美元。巴基斯坦的電信業成了中國的禁臠,中國移動公司不僅收購了巴科泰爾(巴第5大移動運營商),還對巴基斯坦的通訊系統進行投資,比如讓中國的長城工業公司發射衛星。

The Heritage Foundation figure precludestransactions initiated before 2005 and is therefore too low for a country like Pakistan,where Chinese involvement is long-standing. But it also does not include roadand port projects that have not begun and are unlikely to look anything likethe gigantic endeavors advertised by Pakistan. While Pakistan touts the expansion ofGwadar and other ports as multibillion dollar projects, the leading enterpriseChina Communications Construction notes only a modest project to expandfacilities in Karachi.[26]
2005年之前,傳統基金會的統計排除處理還沒有啟用,所以對于像巴基斯坦這樣中國長期投資的國家來說太低。不過道路和港口項目并不包括在內,也沒有破土動工,看起來更像是巴基斯坦用來宣傳的廣告而已。巴基斯坦把瓜達爾港和其他港口吹噓成幾十億美元的大項目,而中國交通建設集團宣布只是在卡拉奇有一個中等規模的擴建工程。

In sum, Chinese investment activity in Pakistan isquite modest. It is a negligible fraction of total Chinese outward investmentof more than $250 billion since 2005 and dwarfed by Chinese activity in Indonesia,for example.[27] This should not be a surprise. Chinese outward investment ismotivated more by domestic economic needs than by foreign policy goals. Whatthe PRC deems to be strategic sectors—iron, copper, oil, coal, and gas—arematerials needed to keep domestic industry humming and hundreds of millions ofpeople employed. Farmland is similar, though it has proven more difficult toacquire. Pakistanhas comparatively little in the way of any of these resources.
總之,中國對巴基斯坦的直接投資少得可憐。自2005年以來,中國對外投資超過2500億美元,巴基斯坦所占比例微乎其微,比如中國對印尼的投資都更勝一籌。這一點也不奇怪。中國對外投資是受國內經濟需求而不是外交政策的引導。諸如鐵、銅、石油和天然氣等被中國視為戰略利益的資源可以保證國內工業不斷運轉以及數億人的就業。耕地也是一樣,盡管已經被證明難以獲取。而這些資源都是巴基斯坦所不具有的。
(圖1)

Chinese private investors, which are farsmaller than their state-controlled counterparts, seek either an asset thatwill considerably strengthen their position in the home market, or a new marketthey can sell to because they are hampered at home. Textiles might beattractive now that Chinese costs are rising, but most of the textileinvestment moving out of the PRC to this point is foreign-funded. Pakistanagain has fairly little to offer commercially and the political connection hasproven inadequate to spur exchange.
中國的私人投資者遠少于國有企業,他們所尋求的資產極大地加強了其在國內市場的地位,抑或是由于在國內受到了阻滯而開拓新的市場。目前由于中國的成本上升,紡織業受到了青睞,不過絕大部分從中國轉移出去的紡織業投資是由外資控股的。巴基斯坦由于其在經濟上的乏善可陳和政治關聯又一次被證明不足以刺激雙方的貿易。

While Chinais not spending much money itself in Pakistan, it might be financingPakistani spending. Here the evidence is not clear because the principalvehicle for Chinese financing, the China Development Bank (CDB), does notprovide information of the same quality or quantity as many Chinese enterprisesinvesting overseas. The CDB’s foreign loan portfolio has been stated as morethan $140 billion, but the many claims made around the world about its loansadd up to far more than that.[28] One important reason for the gap is thatcountries boast about lines of credit, not actual loans made.
然而中國并沒有在巴基斯坦進行巨額投資,也可能是注資來為巴基斯坦買單。中國在巴基斯坦方面投資甚少也可能是因為這一方面的佐證尚不充分,因為中國的融資巨頭——國家開發銀行(CDB)不像其他在海外投資的中國企業一樣提供足夠多的信息,無論是質量或是數量。國家開發銀行公布的國外放款業務已經超過了1400億美元,但其在全世界范圍內的債權加起來遠不止這些。這其中的差額主要是由各國吹噓的信用額度造成的,而不是真實的借貸。

In this somewhat unclear environment, itdoes not appear that realized Chinese lending to Pakistan is large or even moderate.Scattered claims of large loans are again unverified by independent sources andtied to projects or shipments that have not yet been made. The PRC typicallylends large amounts in barter—such as loans for oil—or to fund sizableengineering projects, and neither is frequent among Chinese–Pakistani economictransactions.[29]
在這種多少有點不公開的情形下,大筆貸款的零散債券以及與之關聯的工程或者出貨都沒有經過獨立機構的核對。中國大筆貸款的典型方式就是兌換實物,比如石油貸款或者投資大型工程項目,兩者在中巴經濟交易中并不常見。

Indirect evidence comes from thePakistan–China Investment Company (PCIC). The PCIC is an alliance between theChina Development Bank and the Pakistani government.[30] Elsewhere, the ChinaDevelopment Bank uses such entities extensively. The China–Africa DevelopmentFund, for instance, was set up about the same time as PCIC but is 25 timeslarger in terms of capital, and far more active.[31] According to the publicrecord, PCIC does not seem to be doing much of anything.
間接證據則來自中巴聯合投資公司(PCIC)。中巴投資公司是中國國家開發銀行和巴基斯坦政府的聯姻。除此之外,中國國家開發銀行還在其他地區有著類似的機構。舉個例子,幾乎同時建立的中非發展基金的資金規模是中巴投資公司的25倍,而且更為活躍。根據官方記載,中巴投資公司似乎并無多大建樹。

Chinese humanitarian aid to Pakistan also has been modest, especially whencompared to that provided by the U.S. After massive flooding in Pakistan in the summer of 2010, for instance,the U.S.provided nearly $700 million in flood relief and in-kind assistance. Chinaeventually committed to providing $250 million, after a meager initialcontribution of $18 million.[32]
中國對巴基斯坦的人道主義援助規模有限,特別是與美國相比。比如說2010年巴基斯坦的洪災,美國提供了將近7億美元的救濟和實物援助。中國最初打算提供區區1800萬美元,最后決定改為2.5億美元。

While U.S.humanitarian aid outstripped that from China,Beijing hasprovided much-needed reconstruction aid for the worst-hit flood areas. U.S.media reports claimed in September 2010 that 7,000 to 10,000 People’sLiberation Army (PLA) troops were deployed to Gilgit–Baltistan in northernPakistan to help rebuild areas devastated by the 2010 floods.[33] Indiananalysts also noted the presence of PLA logistics and engineering corps in theregion to provide flood relief and to build infrastructure projects, such asroads, railways, and dams. In early October, Indian army chief General V. K.Singh noted that about 3,000 to 4,000 Chinese troops were stationed in northernPakistan focusing on construction projects.[34]
美國的人道主義援助超過了中國,不過北京向受災最嚴重地區提供了急需的重建援助。據2010年9月美國媒體的報道,7000到10000名解放軍調往了巴基斯坦北部吉爾吉特-伯爾蒂斯坦地區幫助重建被2010年洪水摧毀的地區。印度的分析人員也注意到了解放軍的后勤和工程兵部隊在這一地區提供救災物資并建設注入道路、鐵路和水壩等基礎設施。十月上旬,印度陸軍參謀長V.K.辛格稱大約有3000到4000中國軍隊駐扎在巴基斯坦北部進行施工。

The final, and perhaps most important,indication of the limits of the China–Pakistan financial relationship is thePRC’s not-so-gentle shunting of Pakistani aid requests to the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF). The IMF denied large-scale aid requests made by Pakistanimmediately after the September 2008 financial shock, forcing Islamabad toaccept a multi-billion-dollar IMF program with stringent economicconditions.[35] In the end, China did agree to provide around $500 million inconcessionary lending to Pakistan, but its refusal to provide large-scale loansindicates clear limits on China’s willingness to take primary responsibilityfor Pakistan’s financial woes.
最后也可能是最重要的,中巴財政關系的限制體現在巴基斯坦向國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)請求援助,而中國對此采取了并不溫和的回避之舉。國際貨幣基金組織在2008年9月的金融危機之后立即否決了巴基斯坦大規模援助的請求,迫使伊斯蘭堡在其經濟不景氣的時候接受一項數十億美元的IMF項目。最后,中國才同意向巴基斯坦提供了約5億美元的特許貸款,不過這一大筆貸款的優先取舍權表明了中國并不是那么樂意替巴基斯坦的財政困難來買單。

Gwadar Port Project:More Symbolism than Substance?
瓜達爾港工程:象征意義大于實質效果?


Chinese lending for the Gwadar Portproject in Pakistan’s Baluchistanprovince on the Arabian Sea has received agreat deal of media attention. China has reportedly financed around 80 percentof the $250 million estimated cost for completion of the first phase of theproject, and has agreed to fund most of the second phase, which could costnearly $500 million and feature the construction of several additional berthsand terminals.
巴基斯坦俾路支省的瓜達爾港瀕臨阿拉伯海,中國在此投資的項目受到了媒體的矚目。據報道,中國已經向完成工程第一階段所需的2.5億美元注資了80%左右,第二階段主要建設數個附加的泊位和碼頭,預計花費大約5億美元,中國同意承擔大部分投資。

China’s financing of the port has drawnattention since access to the port would allow China to secure oil and gassupplies from the Persian Gulf and potentially project power in the IndianOcean.[36] The port complex is expected to provide industrial facilities formore than 20 countries and eventually have the capability to receive oiltankers with a capacity of 200,000 tons. Pakistan signed an agreement withthe Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) in 2007 to run the port for the next 25years. However, progress on construction of associated road, rail, and pipelineinfrastructure needed to create the core export-processing zone has lagged dueto security risks and continued attacks on sites and workers.[37]
中國對瓜達爾港的投資引起關注是在獲得了港口的使用權之后,中國不僅可以安全無虞地從波斯灣獲得石油和天然氣,而且有可能向印度洋投送軍力。整個港口有望為20多個國家提供工業設施,并最終成為可以停泊20萬噸油輪的港口。2007年新加坡港務局同巴基斯坦簽署協議,在接下來的25內管理瓜達爾港。可是由于危險分子對場所和工人進行襲擊,核心加工出口區的建設已經遲滯于配套的公路、鐵路和管道等基礎設施。

India, the U.S., andother countries are concerned that China may eventually seek access tothe port for its warships. Indeed, Pakistan’sdefense minister recently claimed that Pakistanhad invited Chinato start building a naval base at Gwadar; Chinese officials publicly dismissedthe notion. It is unclear whether Islamabad madethe statement without coordinating with Beijingor whether the episode was carefully choreographed to send a signal to theinternational community (i,e., the U.S.and India)about the potential global impact of a cozier Sino–Pakistani alliance.
印度、美國和其他國家擔心中國可能最終為它的軍艦謀求港口的使用權。最近,巴基斯坦的國防部長聲稱巴基斯坦已經邀請中國在瓜達爾港建設海軍基地,中國政府公開否認了這一消息。到底是伊斯蘭堡的聲明沒有得到北京的配合,還是這個精心設計的橋段向國際社會(比如美國和印度)傳達了一個更為密切的中巴同盟潛在的全球影響力,那就不得而知了。

Trade also Lagging
同樣落后的貿易


Trade is not exaggerated by Pakistanor rendered unclear by Chinese secrecy. As with investment and (apparently)finance, though, it is relatively insubstantial. On Chinese figures, bilateraltrade volume was below $9 billion in 2010 and grew slightly less quickly thanthe PRC’s overall trade. The Philippinesare similar to Pakistan inGDP and not as close politically with China. The Philippinesmining sector is underdeveloped. Yet China’sbilateral trade with the Philippinesin 2010 was still three times larger than its trade with Pakistan, and grew faster.
巴基斯坦沒有夸大貿易,中國也沒有含糊其辭。正如投資和財政一樣,貿易同樣經不起推敲。中國的報表顯示,2009年的雙邊貿易量少于90億美元,與中國的總貿易量相比略有增長但增速較慢。菲律賓與巴基斯坦的GDP大致相等,但在政治上與中國并不緊密。菲律賓的采礦業并不發達。然而2010年中國同菲律賓的雙邊貿易量是巴基斯坦的三倍,增速也是如此。

(圖2)

Not only is the trade relationship small,it is imbalanced. The PRC’s 2010 surplus was $5.2 billion, tiny by Chinesestandards, but huge in comparison to bilateral trade volume. If Beijing wanted to assist Islamabadfor political reasons, it could artificially inflate imports from Pakistan, atleast on a temporary basis. Cosmetic efforts along these lines are routinelymade with the PRC’s major economic partners,[38] but Pakistan clearly does not qualify.
貿易規模不僅小,而且不均衡。2010年中國的順差是52億美元,按照中國人的標準數額很小,但對于雙邊貿易來說就非常大了。如果北京為了政治原因而幫助伊斯蘭堡,就應該人為地從巴基斯坦進口,至少暫時這么做。按照這一方針,表面上雖然成為了中國的主要經濟伙伴,但巴基斯坦很明顯還不夠格。

(圖3)


In contrast to lagging trade with Pakistan, China’strade relationship with Indiais increasing at a relatively fast pace. Sino–Indian trade has increased fromaround $5 billion in 2002 to more than $60 billion in 2010, and the two sideshave pledged to boost trade over the next five years to $100 billion annually.While Sino–Indian border tensions persist, their rapidly expanding traderelationship is a positive indicator and could encourage mutual interest inregional stability, and greater attention on the part of Beijingto balancing ties between Pakistanand India.
中國同印度的貿易迅速增長,與巴基斯坦形成鮮明對比。中印貿易從2002年的50億美元增加到了2010年的600億美元,同時雙方承諾在接下來的5年內把貿易增加到每年1000億美元。如今中印邊界仍然很緊張,而迅速增長的貿易不失為一個積極的風向標,有助于雙方保持這一地區的穩定,并讓北京把更多的注意力放在平衡自身與印巴的關系上。

U.S.Policy—Dos and Don’ts
美國的政策——何去何從


Pakistan’s effort to spotlight its growing ties to China is partly an attempt to build confidencedomestically in the wake of the Osama bin Laden raid, which embarrassed thePakistani military and fueled doubts about the U.S. as a reliable partner. Islamabad is also signaling Washingtonthat it has other foreign policy options to pursue if the U.S. pushes thePakistani government too far on counterterrorism issues. Some in the U.S. accept this line of thinking and worryabout pushing Pakistanfurther into China’sembrace, viewing China as atool of leverage that Pakistanholds over the U.S.
奧薩瑪·本·拉登遇襲之后,巴基斯坦軍方感到局促不安,開始懷疑美國這個盟友的可靠性,于是巴基斯坦通過向外界展示其與中國不斷加深的聯系來樹立國內的信心。伊斯蘭堡同時也向華盛頓發出信號,如果美國在反恐問題上對巴基斯坦打壓太甚,他們還有其他的外交政策可供選擇。一些美國人接受了這一思想,擔心把巴基斯坦推向了中國的懷抱,并視中國為巴基斯坦用來制衡美國的一張王牌。

But U.S.policymakers must recognize that there are limits to what Pakistan can expect from its relationship with China.Pakistan has traditionallysought close ties with both Chinaand the U.S. and it wouldhave to seriously consider the costs of putting all its eggs in the China basket. China’s lack of interest in bailing Pakistan out economically and the substantialinfluence the U.S. wieldswithin international lending organizations, such as the IMF and World Bank, arefactors that Islamabadwould have to take into account. Moreover, Chinais increasingly concerned about the spillover of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, and there may be room for Washington to seek cooperation with Beijingin encouraging a more stable and prosperous Pakistan.
不過美國的決策者必須意識到巴基斯坦從中國獲得的利益是有限的。一直以來,巴基斯坦與中美雙方保持著密切的關系,他們必須認真考慮把所有的雞蛋都放在中國的籃子里的代價。中國沒有興趣幫助巴基斯坦擺脫經濟困境,而美國動用諸如IMF和世界銀行等國際借貸機構的實質影響則是伊斯蘭堡不得不深思熟慮的。此外,中國越來越擔心巴基斯坦極端主義和恐怖主義的滲透,美國應該在支持一個更加穩定和繁榮的巴基斯坦方面尋求與北京的合作。

To achieve its policy objectives withregard to Pakistan, the U.S.should:

Pursue U.S.counterterrorism policies directed at Pakistan without worrying about thepolicies’ impact on Pakistani–Chinese relations. Some in the U.S. argue for softer counterterrorism policiestoward Pakistan because theyfear a tough approach would push Islamabadfurther into Beijing’sembrace. This is a straw-man argument, however, as Chinadoes not want full responsibility for Pakistanand its economic challenges and prefers that Washingtonremain engaged with Islamabad.U.S. policymakers shouldrecognize that Pakistan usesthe China card to scare U.S. officials into thinking they have no choiceother than to appease Pakistanwhen it comes to terrorism and provision of military aid.
為了實現關于巴基斯坦的政治目標,美國應該:

繼續在巴基斯坦執行美國的反恐政策,無需擔心該政策對巴中關系的影響。一些美國人支持對巴基斯塔采取更加柔和的反恐政策,因為他們害怕逼得太急,伊斯蘭堡會倒向北京的懷抱。然而這種論點偷換了概念,因為中國不想為巴基斯坦窘迫的經濟買單,更希望華盛頓繼續同伊斯蘭堡接洽。美國的決策者別無選擇,除非就恐怖主義和軍事援助的條款滿足巴基斯坦的胃口。

Enhance dialogue with China on Pakistan’s future prospects forstability, including ways to dampen extremist trends in Pakistani society andto reduce terrorist recruitment. There are indications that China is worriedabout the prospect of further destabilization in Pakistan and has engaged incontingency planning for different possible scenarios in Pakistan, includingspreading Islamist militancy and nuclear weapons falling into the wronghands.[39] The U.S. should convince China to adopt a more holistic approach toterrorism issues in Pakistan, explaining that Pakistan’s support for someterrorist groups strengthens the ideological base, logistical capabilities, andfinancial support for all Islamist terrorist groups. As part of this effort, Washington should share any available intelligence with Beijing on the possiblepresence of Chinese citizens at Pakistan-based terrorist training camps.
就巴基斯坦未來穩定的前景加強與中國的對話,包括遏制巴基斯坦社會上的極端主義趨勢,減少恐怖分子的招募。種種跡象表明,中國對巴基斯坦局勢的進一步惡化感到擔憂,準備了應急預案來應對可能發生在巴基斯坦的不同狀況,包括伊斯蘭恐怖活動以及核武器落入壞人之手。美國應該說服中國在巴基斯坦的恐怖主義問題上高瞻遠矚,因為伊斯蘭堡支持的一些恐怖組織為所有伊斯蘭恐怖組織加強了意識形態基礎、后勤能力以及財政支持。作為這項工作的一部分,華盛頓應該就巴基斯坦恐怖主義訓練營中的中國人的情報同北京共享。

Initiate discussions with Beijingabout U.S. and Chineseinvestment and trade with Pakistanthat would contribute to its stability. Fears of China“owning” Pakistanare unfounded, as the economic relationship is simply not that substantial.Indeed, the U.S.should welcome greater Chinese–Pakistani economic interaction, particularlyadditional Chinese investment, construction, lending, and trade, sincebolstering the Pakistani economy will help create conditions for greaterstability and prosperity in the country. While joint Sino–American assistanceprojects are impractical because the two countries operate so differentlycommercially, the comparative advantage of U.S. direct investment in areassuch as agriculture, finance, and education could complement the Chineseinvestments in telecommunications and port construction. Shared informationcould improve the quality of both sides’ work.
就中美兩國與巴基斯坦有助于穩定的投資貿易方面的問題與北京展開對話。中國‘擁有’巴基斯坦的擔憂是不成立的,因為經濟關聯沒有觸及根本。美國應該歡迎中巴經濟交流的增長,特別是增加中國的投資、建設、貸款和貿易,因為支持巴基斯坦經濟有助于巴基斯坦的穩定和前景。然而中美聯合起來搞援助工程是不現實的,因為兩個國家的商業運作大相徑庭,美國比較占優勢的直接投資領域是農業、金融和教育,而中國的投資則在通訊和港口建設。共享信息有助于提高雙方工作的效率。

Include Chinain some multilateral approaches to Pakistan’seconomic challenges and coordinate with China on bilateral assistance. China should be invited to participate fully asthe IMF continues to work with Pakistan’sprivate creditors, for instance. At the moment, due to the unusual nature ofits financial assistance, Chinalargely deals separately with Pakistan,an arrangement that does not benefit private creditors or American interestsand does not seem to have appealed much to China, either. A more unifiedapproach would increase outside leverage and coherence in pushing Pakistanto make needed reform.
解決巴基斯坦的經濟困局,需要包括中國在內的多國參與,在雙邊援助上也要與中國合作。舉個例子,隨著IMF與巴基斯坦私人債權人進行合作,中國也應該充分地參與進來。與此同時,由于經濟援助不同尋常,中國與巴基斯坦的大部分交易都是獨立的,私人債權人或美國并未從中受益,中國似乎對此并不感冒。


Discourage China’ssale of new nuclear reactors to Pakistan,citing concerns over proliferation. The U.S.must hold firm to its opposition to the sale of new nuclear reactors to Pakistanoutside the international nonproliferation regime. Pakistan is expanding and improvingits nuclear arsenal more rapidly than any country in the world, and isestimated to have produced sufficient fissile material to manufacture anadditional 100 nuclear weapons to supplement the approximately 100 weaponsalready in its possession. At its current rate of production, Islamabad is poised to become one of the topfour largest nuclear powers in the world. Given concerns over extremistsgaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear technology and past incidents of nuclearproliferation from Pakistan, namely the A. Q. Khan nuclear black market thatfacilitated the Libyan, Iranian, and North Korean nuclear weapons programs,China should demonstrate that it is a responsible international actor when itcomes to Pakistan and nuclear issues. Moving forward with the sale of two newnuclear reactors outside the international regime to a country at high risk forfurther proliferation would call China’s own nonproliferationcredentials into question. Indeed China’sconcerns over prospects for stability in Pakistanshould prompt China to takegreater interest in measures to enhance the security of Pakistan’snuclear weapons arsenal.
因為害怕造成擴散而阻止中國向巴基斯坦銷售新的核反應堆。美國必須堅決反對在國際防擴散框架之外(中國)把新的核反應堆賣給巴基斯坦。巴基斯坦擴張和研發核武庫的速度超過了世界上任何一個國家,據估計巴基斯坦生產的核燃料足夠制造100枚核武器來補充現有的100枚核武器。按照目前的生產速度,伊斯蘭堡隨時準備著躍居成為全球四大核武器大國之一。出于對巴基斯坦的核技術落到極端分子手中的擔憂,以及過去巴基斯坦的核擴散,也就是阿巴杜·卡迪爾·汗的地下核市場促進了利比亞、伊朗和朝鮮的核武器項目,中國應該在巴基斯坦和核問題上證明自己是一個負責任的大國。中國在國際體系之外銷售兩座新的核反應堆可能會進一步提高核擴散的風險,并使中國自身的防擴散信用受到質疑。中國對巴基斯坦穩定的前景感到擔憂,促使中國采取進一步的措施來加強巴基斯坦核武庫的安全。

Conclusion
結論


China’s concerns about the future development of Pakistan will likely limit the extent to whichit will help Pakistanout of its economic difficulties. While Chinahas an interest in maintaining strong security ties with Pakistan, the notion that Chinese ties couldserve as a replacement for U.S.ties is far-fetched. Instead of wringing its hands over Chinese influence with Pakistan, the U.S.should seek Beijing’s cooperation in encouraginga more stable and prosperous Pakistan.
中國對巴基斯塔未來前景的擔憂可能會影響到幫助巴基斯坦擺脫經濟困局的力度。中國感興趣的是與巴基斯坦保持強有力的安全關系,用中國來取代美國的想法是不切實際的。美國應該在支持一個更加穩定和繁榮的巴基斯坦方面尋求與北京的合作,而不是排擠中國對巴基斯坦的影響。
原創翻譯:龍騰網 http://www.ltaaa.com 翻譯:病中乃知 轉載請注明出處
 
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